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Introduction
MORE than 200 years ago, Adam Smith wrote that if the interest rate was fixed too high ... the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and profectors ... Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the competition.'
In Stiglitz-Weiss (1981 , 1983 ), we developed a theory of credit rationing. We argued that banks might not increase the interest rate they charged even in the face of an excess demand for funds, for to do so might reduce their expected rate of return because the probability of default would increase. Two reasons were presented for the possible inverse relationship between the rate of interest charged and the expected return to the bank: higher interest rates reduce the proportion of low risk borrowers (the sorting effect to which Smith had called attention) and higher interest rates induce borrowers to use riskier techniques (the incentive effect). 2 We argued that collateral and other non-price rationing devices would not eliminate the possibility of credit rationing. Increasing collateral requirements makes borrowers less willing to take risks, which increases the return to the bank. On the other hand, increasing collateral requirements may adversely affect the mix of applicants.3 Even if all individuals had the same utility functions and faced the same investment opportunities, wealthier individuals would both be willing to put up more collateral and would undertake riskier projects than would less wealthy individuals if there was decreasing absolute risk aversion.4 Moreover, if large wealth accumulations are the result of risk-taking plus luck, a disproportionately large fraction of the very wealthy those who would put 8 For example, in a recent paper, DeMeza and Webb (1987) only consider the sorting effects of credit contracts. They find that informational asymmetries lead to overinvestment in a model in which the return on safe projects (whether successful or unsuccessful) are the same as those of risky projects. Thus they assume that among observationally identical projects, some stochastically dominate others. Their results also depend on this assumption.
9 Jon Fay and James Medoff (1985) cite the 'substantial literature' on the positive correlation between employment and labor productivity over the business cycle. They present firm level data that suggests that this correlation is due to labor hoarding in slumps. We are not concerned with explaining the pro-cyclical pattern of labor productivity; we are rather concerned with why, given the procyclical movement of average, and presumably marginal productivity, real interest rates are not clearly pro-cyclical. The presence of labor hoarding simply implies that the 'true' increase in the labor-capital ratio in booms is greater than the 'observed' increase. 10 Moreover, the kinds of explanations for deviations from observed average market prices and marginal productivities which are sometimes adduced in other markets-such as the presence of long term contracts-seem unpersuasive in this context. Movements of real interest rates in auction markets, such as the market for government bills, show similar patterns; and to the extent that there are differences, such as loan rates failing to fall as much as T bill rates in the Great Depression, the differences are just the opposite from what one would expect from a long term relationship, for they entail a substantial increase in real interest rates charged during slumps.
" One cautionary note is perhaps in order at this point. The equilibria discussed in Section I are not, in general, unique. It is a commonplace observation that in models with multiple equilibria, Thus, the current paper extends our earlier work in three essential ways: it incorporates simultaneously both selection and incentive effects; it considers simultaneously both price (interest rate) and non-price (collateral) terms of the loan contract; and it goes beyond the microeconomic implications of our theory of credit for credit rationing and red-lining to analyze the macroeconomic implications, both with respect to cyclical movements of variables, such as the real interest rate, as well as the effectiveness of monetary policy.12
Microeconomic equilibrium
This section is divided into four parts. The first describes the basic model, the second provides some preliminary analytics, the third describes the market equilibrium and the fourth discusses several extensions of the analysis.
The basic model
The model consists of a description of borrowers and banks and an analysis of their interactions.
(a) Borrowers. We assume that the representative borrower has two possible techniques into which he can invest the funds lent by the bank. A project either is successful, yielding a return of RS or Rr depending on the technique used, with RS < Rr; or is unsuccessful, in which case it has a return of zero. The probability of success of the 'safe' technique is pS, for the risky, pr, with pS > pr. Lenders cannot observe directly which technique a borrower is using. A project there are problems with comparative statics because the policy change might induce a 'switch' to another equilibrium.
However, if one took this observation to mean that one should never calculate comparative statics for models with multiple equilibria, this would almost always prevent economic models from being used to guide policy. It is unlikely that a reasonable model of the economy can be constructed that does not have multiple equilibria. For example, the economy that we are acquainted with has weekends on Saturday and Sunday. There is undoubtedly another (more or less efficient equilibrium) with weekends on Sunday and Monday. We do not believe that the existence of this other equilibrium precludes economic analysis of the effects of the 1986 tax reforms, or predictions of the effects of a drought on GNP. Nor should the existence of multiple equilibria in our model preclude analyses of past changes in interest rates: the detailed investigation of credit markets that is needed to give our model empirical content would also reveal which equilibria the economy was in.
On the other hand, if it is not implausible that the contemplated policies would change the strategies of banks, moving the economy from one equilibria (such as each bank offering only one credit contract) to a different one (such as one where every bank offers several credit contracts), then that possibility should be acknowledged. While in those circumstances the existence of multiple equilibria still does not foreclose economic analysis, it does introduce an additional form of uncertainty into the analysis-strategic uncertainty in which the market participants are uncertain of what strategies the other participants will be playing. OEP/698 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS costs a fixed amount, greater than the wealth of any borrower; we normalize this cost at unity. Each borrower can undertake at most one project. (Our results only require that there be a region of increasing returns to scale.13 The stronger assumption of fixed project size is made for expositional ease.) Banks make loan offers characterized by an interest rate r and a collateral requirement C. The borrower has an initial wealth of WO; this is of two forms: collateralizable wealth, C0, and non-collateralizable wealth, Ho. The latter includes pensions, potential inheritances, and human capital. For simplicity, we assume all borrowers have the same utility function. Differences in wealth then induce differences in the indifference curves between the required interest payments on a loan and the required collateral.'4 Similar considerations are germane to an analysis of corporate borrowing. Although corporations do not have non-collateralizable wealth of the form we have discussed, the relevant decision makers in different corporations are affected differently when a corporation goes bankrupt. In the case of large publicly traded corporations the relevant decision maker may have substantial wealth that is not tied to the solvency of the corporation, while the owner-operator of small privately owned corporations may lose a large proportion of his assets in the case of corporate bankruptcy. The proportion of a decision maker's wealth that is linked to the solvency of the corporation, and the opportunities to remove that wealth prior to bankruptcy, are typically not fully known by lenders.
Wealth not invested in the project yields a safe return of i*. The bank requires the borrower to put up collateral C, and to pay interest on its loan of r.'5 (Alternatively, the bank could require the borrower to invest in the project. None of our results would change if the bank required the borrower to put up some of his liquid assets as equity.) Thus, if the project is successful, the end-of-period wealth of the borrower is16 Y, = W + R-(1 + r) (la) 13 Not even that assumption is required for the analysis. What is required is that there be an initial non-convexity in the function relating expected loan returns to loan size. The incentive compatibility constraints may induce such a non-convexity, even when the underlying production technology is convex. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Hellwig (1977).
14 It should be clear that all that is required for the subsequent analysis is that the slopes of these indifference curves differ systematically with wealth. It does not matter whether those differences arise solely from differences in wealth, or from differences in the underlying preferences. 15 We assume that the loan can only be partially collaterized, i.e. C < 1, implying that the bank must charge an interest rate r > i*. With full collateral, loans would not be risky, and would accordingly bear the same interest rate as government securities, providing strong evidence that even in the most highly collaterized loans, collateral is limited. What is relevant, from the perspective of the lender, is the value of the collateral in those events when the borrower defaults. These circumstances (as the S &L's in the United States have discovered with a vengeance) are precisely the circumstances when collateral is likely to have a low value, and thus not fully compensate the lender for what is due to him. 16 17 We are implicitly assuming that in the case of default the bank can only attach the assets of the borrower that have been put up as collateral. We would argue that this is realistic both for the case of individuals and corporations. Typically even unsecured loans that are a small fraction of a borrower's wealth demand much higher interest rates than secured loans. This is because the post-default bargaining position of a bank is seriously affected by whether it has physical possession of sufficient collateral to cover the debt. If the bank needs to sue for wealth that has not been put up as collateral there are many opportunities for the borrower to avoid payment. In the case of corporations typically stockholders get some share of the assets in the case of bankruptcy even when unsecured debtors are getting less than the full value of their debt. The formulation in (1) implicity assumes that while the bank holds the collateral, it earns an interest rate of i, which is returned to the borrower if he repays the loan and is appropriated by the lender if he does not. 
For a given project, the iso-return curve is a straight line. As can be seen in Figure 5 , the iso-return line below the switch line intersects the switch line at a point southwest of where the iso-return line above the switch line intersects the switch line. This is because of the discrete change in the technique used.2' Regardless of whether the individual uses the safe or the risky technique the borrower's indifference curve is steeper than the bank's iso-return locus, because the borrower is risk averse.22 (c) Equilibrium. Banks know that there are poor and rich borrowers, but cannot ascertain who is of which type. They know, however, that the choice of credit contracts-defined here by an interest rate and collateral requirementmay reveal information about who is of which type; the mix of applicants at one contract may differ from the mix at another (clearly any borrower applying for a contract with collateral requirements in excess of Cp must be rich). They also know that contracts have incentive effects, determining whether a rich or poor borrower undertakes the safe or risky project.
In equilibrium, the set of loan contracts offered and loan commitments made by banks, must be such that no bank can increase its profits by offering a different 20 Using (2) in regions X or Z, where the two individuals differ only in wealth, dIn U'0/U'1 U'6 U= dW U'0 1 with decreasing absolute risk aversion. In Region Y, while for the rich, (1 -p)/p is higher, U'/ U'1 will be smaller. 21 Formally at the switch line, the choice of technique is unrestricted by notions of dominance or any of the equilibrium refinements. (The individual is indifferent as to which technique he employs.) Accordingly, we can assume that on the switch line the borrower is undertaking the safe project with some probability. For each point on the switch line there is some probability of undertaking the safe project, such that the expected return to the bank is v. In this sense, then, the iso-return curve to the bank, though peculiarly shaped, is not necessarily discontinuous. It follows the switch line connecting the straight lines in Figure 3 . However, as will be apparent below if a pooling or complete separating equilibrium exists it is characterized by all those borrowers who are indifferent between safe and risky projects choosing the safe projects. The interest rate paid depositors elicits a supply of lonable funds equal to the equilibrium quantity of loan acceptances.24 In this paper, we do not formally model the supply function of funds, simply hypothesizing that it is an increasing function of the interest rate paid depositors (i): L = L(i), L'(i) > 0. We assume banks are sufficiently small that no bank affects the interest rate paid depositors.25 We also assume that each bank is large enough that its probability of bankruptcy is negligible. (These two assumptions are consistent, provided the economy is large enough.)
Some preliminaries
Several properties of the equilibrium may easily be derived. First, in equilibrium, each bank earns zero profits. If a bank earned negative profits it would not make any loans. If any bank made positive profits some other bank would offer a slightly more attractive set of contracts, one that attracts all the borrowers that were previously getting loans and does not change the choices made by those borrowers.26 It follows that in equilibrium, the rate of interest paid depositors must be equal to the expected return on a loan contract.
We denote by v, { K } the expected return to the bank from contract K when a fraction x of those taking it are poor; v1 is the expected return when only 23 Formally, we can describe interactions of banks and borrowers in terms of a game. We use the Kreps-Wilson definition of a sequential equilibrium, and do not allow (weakly) dominated strategies to be played in equilibrium.
The actions of borrowers and lenders follow a sequence of moves which can be broken down into five stages. In the first stage, banks choose contracts to offer. In the second stage, borrowers apply for loans. A borrower cannot apply for a loan contract that requires more collateral than the borrower has. In the third stage, banks make loan commitments-accept borrowers. In the fourth stage, borrowers accept from among the contracts that they were offered the one that gives them the highest expected utility. If borrowers are offered several loans that give them the same utility, they randomize their choices.
In the final stage of the game, borrowers choose the investment project that maximizes their expected returns given their loan contracts. For simplicity, we assume banks do not observe the contracts offered by their rivals and hence their offers cannot be contingent on others' (unobservable) contracts.
We could alternatively have assumed that banks can observe the contracts offered by other banks when determining the quantity of loans to make. Assuming that contracts are not observed allows us to use the Nash definition of equilibrium and still ignore out-of-equilibrium moves such as threats of the form 'if you offer an attractive loan contract I'll make so many loans that the interest rate paid depositors will be so high that we shall both lose money'. If contracts offered by other banks are observed then we would have to require that equilibria satisfy subgame perfection to eliminate these unreasonable threats.
24 Alternatively, we could have included an auction for deposits as a formal part of the game. However, adding bids for deposits to the action space of lenders increases the complexity of the model without substantively changing the results. We denote the maximized expected utility of type i with contract K as UI { K }. Since only rich borrowers can choose contract { G} we write vo { G} as v(G); vp{F} may be either greater or less than v(G). The collateral requirement is higher at G than at F and this increases the bank's expected return; but the interest rate may be lower (because the rich borrower's switch line lies below that of the poor).27 27 Obviously, if the interest rate at G is greater than at F (or not much less), then bank profits at G exceed those at F. Increases in the collateralizable wealth of the rich have two effects: the switch line is shifted down, which decreases the bank's profits; while the direct effect of more collateral serves to increase the bank's profits. The net effect is ambiguous, and depends on the extent to which (absolute) risk aversion decreases with wealth and on the relative differences between the collateralizable and non-collateralizable wealth of the rich and poor. If there is constant absolute risk aversion, then the switch lines would coincide; by continuity, with slightly decreasing absolute risk aversion, the bank's return at G always exceeds that at F. The converse will be true if there is strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion, and the difference in non-collateralizable wealth between the rich and poor borrowers is large relative to the difference between their collateralizable wealth.
OEP/706 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS

Equilibrium with incentive and sorting effects
For simplicity of exposition, we focus in the text on the case where each bank can issue only one loan contract. In Appendix C, we consider the more general case. (The equilibria that we describe turn out also to be equilibria if each bank is allowed to issue more than one contract, but with this wider set of available strategies, there may be other equilibria as well.)28
There may exist reasonable equilibria with and without rationing. Either may be characterized by complete pooling (all rich and poor borrowers receiving the same contract) or by partial separating (at least some of the rich borrowers receiving loans at different contract terms from those received by the poor borrowers).
1.3.a. A pure pooling equilibrium with rationing
We first show that if there is a pure pooling equilibrium with rationing, it must be at {F}, the contract requiring Cp of collateral, and offering the highest interest rate at which the poor borrowers invest in the safe project. We shall assume that profits (per dollar loaned) at F when the fraction of the poor equals or exceeds z are higher than at any contract where the borrowers use the risky technique.29 Hence, we can exclude every contract in region X of To see this, first note that even without this restriction, the five stage game can be reduced to a three stage game. This is because whatever beliefs borrowers have, their actions in the fourth and fifth periods are automatic. They choose the best contract offered to them, and given that contract, they choose the technique that maximizes their expected utility.
When lenders offer only a single contract, once a contract is offered the reactions of borrowers are automatic (except when they are indifferent between two projects). The only undominated strategies are ones in which borrowers apply for every contract that makes them better off than not borrowing. Because loan applications to one bank are not observed by other banks, the loan a borrower received from any bank would not be changed by his applications to another bank. By the same token, given the actions of the other banks, each bank simply chooses the loan contract that maximizes its expected profits per dollar loaned. Thus, the entire five stage game is reduced to a single stage. If the bank offers a contract with C > Cp, clearly only the rich will undertake if. The contract that maximizes the return from the rich, assuming that they undertake the safe project, is {G}. By (a), and the assumption that banks compete for depositors, even if the rich were to accept contract { G}, the bank would lose money on those contracts. By assumption, the contract that maximizes the return to the risky project (zero collateral) yields a lower return than {F},30 and afortiori, the contract that maximizes the return to the risky project, subject to the constraint that it generates a level of expected utility greater than U'{F}, must yield a lower return than {F}.
If v{G} > vz(F), then, because any lender that offered {G} would find that some individuals those who were not offered loans at {F}-would accept the contract, a pure pooling rationing equilibrium could not be sustained. (ii) C < Cp, then Ur{r, C} > Ur{H} (infeasibility of profitable separation) (c) v{H} > v{G} (H is more profitable than G).
1.3.c. A partial pooling-partial separating equilibrium with rationing
There are also rationing equilibria in which some of the rich and poor borrow at the same terms, while some rich borrowers accept contracts that are not chosen by any poor borrowers.
Suppose: i) the rich borrowers prefer contract {G} to contract {F}, that is,
There is a rationing equilibrium in which some banks offer contract { F } and others offer contract { G}. All the rich borrowers apply for loans at every bank offering either contract {G} or {F}. A rich borrower only accepts a contract {F} offer if he is not offered a {G} loan. In equilibrium, the number of rich borrowers getting G loans, NG with C > CP. These will only be taken up by the rich, and the most profitable of such contracts is {G}. Next, consider contracts with C < CP. The most profitable of such contracts in region Y is clearly {F}. And in region X, both groups use the risky technique, and accordingly the returns to the bank are lower.
Proof that partial pooling-partial separating equilibrium can arise. A natural question is whether the inequalities v1{F} > v{G} > v {F} and EUr{G} > EU'{F} are consistent with one another. With (sufficiently) decreasing absolute risk aversion and (sufficiently) large differences in non-collateralizable wealth, the switch line of the poor is moved up relative to the rich enough that both v1{F} > v{G} and EUr{G} > EUr{F}. In Figure 7 we depict, for fixed collateralizable and non-collateralizable wealth of the poor and given decreasing absolute risk aversion utility functions, the set of collateralizable and non-collateralizable wealth levels of the rich for which there may exist a partially separating equilibrium.32 32The proof proceeds first by expressing the contract { G} as a function C, and W. Then v1 {F} = vo{G} and EUV{G} = EU?{F} can be viewed as defining implicit relations between W. and Cr. We evaluate the derivative dWr/dCr at {CP, Wp}, and show that the equal return locus lies below the equal utility locus, and both loci have positive, finite slopes. Since for a partial-pooling equilibrium, endowments must lie above the equal utility locus (so the rich prefer G to F) and above the equal return locus (so the return to loans to the poor only at F yield higher returns than to the rich at G), the relative slopes of the loci ensures that there exist endowments supporting partial-separating equilibria with rationing. then there exists an equilibrium in which all borrowers apply for loans at F and rejected rich borrowers borrow at H; there may be rationing at F but there will not be rationing at H. The reasoning is as follows: any rich borrower that gets a loan at F takes it. A lender offering a contract southwest of F or H would incur losses; a contract northeast of H would not attract any borrowers, a contract northeast of F would only attract rich borrowers and, hence, losses.
There are also equilibria in which each bank offers several contracts.
1.3.e. Interpretation and comments on equilibria
(a) A given market can either have a pure pooling rationing equilibrium or a partially separating rationing equilibrium, but not both. This follows from the fact that the pooling equilibrium with rationing requires v{G} < vJ{F}, the partially separating equilibrium requires that v { G } > vJ { F }.
(b) Note that this analysis differs from the earlier Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson analyses in several fundamental ways. First, we have both adverse selection (sorting) and moral hazard (incentive) problems. Second, because of the incentive effects of contracts, there may exist pooling equilibria (even at interior points in the contract space). Third, in the R-S-W analyses, equilibrium is fully revealing, and there is no rationing. Here, in both the pure pooling and in the partially separating equilibria, we do not obtain full revelation, while we do obtain rationing. This is in spite of the fact that we have enriched the 'strategy' space to allow simultaneous use of both interest rates and collateral requirements, and to allow banks to offer several contracts.
Some extensions
1.4.a. Differing sets offeasible techniques
Allowing the set of feasible techniques to differ across borrowers, makes our results easier to obtain. This can be seen by observing that the conditions for a pure pooling equilibrium with rationing are certainly more readily satisfied if the set of techniques available to the poor borrowers stochastically dominates OEP/712 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS the techniques available to rich borrowers. In that case, a lender would be less likely to increase collateral as a means of eliminating rationing.
1.4.b. Continuum of projects
Allowing each type of borrower to choose from a continuum of projects, rather than just two projects requires a slight change of notation, but otherwise does not substantially affect our results. In the case of a pure pooling equilibrium, we define r* [z, C] as the interest rate at which the bank's expected return per dollar loaned is maximized when it requires Cp of collateral on loans to a proportion z of poor borrowers. If the return on contract (r*, Cp) exceeds the maximum return on a loan to a rich borrower, and there is an excess demand for credit when contract {r*, Cp} is offered, then there is a pure pooling equilibrium with all banks offering contract {r*, Cp}. Similar arguments can be made for extending our construction of partially separating contracts and completely separating contracts with rationing to the case where a continuum of techniques is available to borrowers.
1.4.c. Many types of borrowers
Our model, in which each type of borrower has a different endowment of collateralizable wealth, may also be directly extended to the case of many types of borrowers. The analyses of pure pooling and the separating equilibria with rationing follow directly from our analysis with two types. In the pure pooling equilibrium all borrowers again choose contract {F}.
In the case of a partial pooling equilibrium, we begin with the wealthiest types, and assume that in equilibrium, among the contracts which are feasible for the richer borrowers, they prefer the higher collateral contracts. The contract { G1 } that maximizes the return for loans to the wealthiest borrowers determines the return v(G1) for all other loans. The proportion of the wealthiest borrowers that get loans at contract { G1 } is just sufficient to ensure that the bank's maximum expected return on loans at a contract requiring collateral equal to the collateralizable wealth of the next wealthiest borrowers is equal to v(G1).
Denoting that contract by { G2 }, the proportion of applicants getting loans at contract { G2 } is such that the maximum return from loans at a contract requiring collateral equal to the collateralizable wealth of the third wealthiest borrowers is also equal to v{G1,}. This process continues through all types. It is easy to specify supply curves for loanable funds and return functions for different types of borrowers that will generate rationing of each type of borrower.
1.4.d. Additional instruments
Collateral is just one of the instruments by which banks attempt to select among applicants and to provide incentives for borrowers to undertake safer projects. Other instruments face similar problems in combining conflicting incentive/selection effects, or in any case, are sufficiently ineffective as to leave J. E. STIGLITZ AND A. WEISS OEP/713 a residual incentive/selection problem of the kind with which we have been concerned here.
Macro-economic implications
In this section, we explore the macro-economic implications of credit rationing. We address three issues: (a) the consequences of a shift in returns to different projects, such as might occur over the business cycle (Section 2.1); (b) the consequences of a shift in the supply of funds (Section 2.2); and (c) the implications of credit rationing for monetary policy (Section 2.3). Macroeconomic analyses that make use of the concept of the 'representative' firm and the representative consumer cannot adequately address macroeconomic problems that arise from imperfect information (where heterogeneity is central). The models we present are intended to be the simplest ones within such problems can be addressed.
Analyses of cyclical variability in interest rates: Effects of changes in productivity
Traditionally, theoretical analyses of cyclical variations in a market consist (in large part) of determining the equilibriating responses in prices (interest rates, wages) and quantities to particular disturbances to demand and supply in various markets. Our theory implies that changes in (real) interest rates charged investors cannot be inferred from an analysis simply of changes in demand and supply for funds. This ambiguity holds even if credit is not being rationed.
Our analysis identifies as critical determinants of the real interest rate charged borrowers the probabilities of success of risky and safe projects. Both probabilities are likely to change over the cycle (as reflected, for instance, in the marked cyclicity of bankruptcy rates). What turns out to be crucial are the relative changes. Our model is consistent with a wide variety of patterns of cyclical movements in interest rates charged, interest rates received, and in the degree of rationing. It is consistent, in particular, with real interest rates charged borrowers rising in recessions while that paid depositors falls. To see this, however, we first need to study the consequences of proportionate changes in success probabilities.
In the preceding section, we showed that equilibria could take on several different forms. Because banks do offer a variety of loan contracts with different collateral requirements, we believe that the partial separating/pooling equilibrium provides the best description of the market. We showed that in such an equilibrium there can be (but, not necessarily is) credit rationing at every contract (loan type).33 The analysis of that case is, however, far more OEP/714 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS tedious than that for pooling equilibria. Accordingly, we present the results for pooling rationing equilibria, and simply summarize the results (presented in Appendix A) for the partial separating/pooling equilibria.
2.1.a. Balanced changes in success probabilities
Assume that the probability of success of both the safe and the risky techniques of production are changed in the same proportion. For simplicity, we write we immediately see that the switch line is unaffected. It thus follows that if there is a pooling equilibrium with rationing, the rate of interest and the collateral requirement will remain unchanged. But since the expected return to the bank (and hence the interest paid to borrowers) is equal to i -v=-P(1 + r) + (1-P)CP (where 3 = zps + (1 -z)pr, the mean probability of success), i is increased by an increase in /1. Given L' (i) > 0 the supply of funds is increased. Hence if the demand for funds is unchanged, the incidence of credit rationing is reduced as the economy goes into a boom. Of course, in practice, over the business cycle, the demand for loans is likely to vary markedly as well, and whether in practice the extent of rationing increases or decreases in booms depends on the relative movements of the demand for funds and the supply. Either is, on a priori grounds, possible.
2.1.b. Unbalanced changes in success probabilities
Assume now, however, that as the economy goes into a recession, risky projects have a disproportionate increase in their probability of failure, and in a boom, they have a disproportionate increase in their probability of success. We write pS* = ,fps, pr* = fpr.
We adopt the convention that / > 1 in a boom, /1 < 1 in a recession, and
that is, the probability of success of a safe project falls in a recession (but less than that of a risky project) and increases in a boom (but again, less than that of a risky project). (10) i.e. the switch line shifts up in a recession as the risky project becomes relatively less attractive, down in a boom. Thus, in the pooling equilibrium, provided risky projects exhibit more cyclical volatility than do safe projects, interest rates charged borrowers will move in a counter-cyclical manner. Even more surprising is the result that for sufficiently 'unbalanced' changes in productivity, the interest rate paid depositors may actuallyfall in a boom. That is, recalling our definition of j as the mean probability of success in a pooling equilibrium, and evaluating v at the pooling equilibrium at F, dv ( alIn (given by (10)). When v decreases and rF decreases, the magnitude of credit rationing will increase in a boom.34 It is thus apparent that our model is consistent with a variety of patterns of cyclical movements of the extent of credit rationing and interest rates paid and charged. Our model is, in particular, consistent with the fact that interest rates are far less volatile than the returns to equity.
Changes in the supply offunds
One of the reasons for our interest in credit rationing is that it raises the possibility that the way that the central bank affects the level of economic activity is not through changes in the interest rate but through changes in credit availability.
In this section, we trace out the consequences of an outward shift in the supply function of resources available to be lent.
As more resources become available, the number of projects undertaken increases, but the average interest rate charged may remain unchanged (in the OEP/716 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CREDIT MARKETS pooling equilibrium) or may actually increase (in the separating or partially separating equilibrium). To see how an increase in the supply of loanable resources could increase the average interest rate charged, observe that an increase in the number of loans made at contract G increases the return to banks from loans at F. Therefore, if returns on the contracts (F) and (G) are to remain the same, the number of loans made at (G) must remain unchanged; small changes in the availability of credit only affect the quantity of low collateral loans. But the interest rate charged on the low collateral loans must exceed that on the high collateral loans, and hence an increase in the supply of loanable resources must cause the average interest rate charged to increase. A fuller analysis of the effects of a change in the supply of loanable resources is contained in Appendix B. There we note too that as the supply curve for funds shifts the nature of the equilibrium (rationing at two contracts, rationing at one contract, no rationing, etc.) may change. We should emphasize that while a reduction in the available resources reduces investments, the projects which are eliminated are not necessarily those with the lowest expected gross returns, ie, those for which, in our model, pR is lowest.
Monetary policy, macroeconomic equilibrium, and credit rationing
There is a sense in which our model conforms closely to traditional views, and a sense in which it differs markedly.
In traditional Keynesian analyses, an increase in 'M' (money supply) leads to a reduction in interest rates; the reduction in interest rates leads to an increase in investment; and the increase in investment leads to a higher level of income.35 The traditional analysis was based on a stable relationship between money, income and interest rates, and is usually motivated by some transactions story (ignoring, of course, the fact that most transactions, in dollar terms, are trades in assets, and there is no a priori reason for a stable relationship between asset transfers and income flows-on the contrary, there are strong a priori reasons that over the business cycle this relationship might change). The traditional analysis also obfuscated which interest rate was relevant, and ignored the fact that, except in certain isolated periods ( Third, our model explains why monetary policy seems to have such different effects in different sectors of the economy,36 and why the interest rate charged borrowers in different sectors may change at different rates, or even in different directions. Our theory predicts that credit rationing may be more important in certain sectors than in others, and indeed a decrease in the availability of credit could be largely felt in a few sectors-those like home construction (i) which are higher leveraged, and (ii) which face (because of information asymmetries) equity and credit rationing.37 Whether one wishes, as a matter of policy, to make those sectors bear the brunt of the required macroeconomic adjustments should be a subject for debate. 36 Though in principle, the interest elasticity of different sectors may well differ, so that a given change in the interest rate would have a different impact on different sectors, interest elasticity itself should be derived from the demand elasticities and production functions of the different sectors. We doubt that there exist reasonable demand elasticities and production functions that would enable the observed patterns of responses can be accounted for within the traditional models. The empirical question is, do we believe, for instance, that the sensitivity of home construction to real interest rates is due to characteristics of the production function or to characteristics of the industry's financial structure, itself related to a variety of organizational factors. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988b Fifth, one of the reasons that monetary policy has effects when it does is that other forms of credit are, for many borrowers, imperfect substitutes for bank borrowing (because of the differential information of the bank, and the problems associated with transferring information).
Concluding remarks
This paper has, we hope, made a contribution both to the microeconomic theory of market equilibrium with asymmetric information and to macroeconomic theory and policy. In most markets, asymmetric information-of both the moral hazard and adverse selection variety-is present and pervasive. We have shown that combining adverse selection and moral hazard considerations in the same model can lead to patterns of equilibria which differ from those which arise when either is present in isolation. Equilibrium may be characterized by complete or partial pooling; there may be (some) self-selection and rationing; and there may be rationing at all contracts.39
Indeed, we have show that there may be credit rationing at all contracts offered, even when collateral can, and is, used optimally (in conjunction with the other provisions of the loan contract, in particular, the interest rate charged) to differentiate among borrowers with differing probabilities of default. Credit rationing can occur if three conditions are satisfied:
1. There must be some residual uncertainty (information imperfection), after lenders employ whatever means they have at their disposal to differentiate among applicants and to control their behavior.40 2. The adverse selection/adverse incentive effects of changing interest rates or the non-price terms of the contract (collateral, equity, etc.) must be sufficiently strong (at some values of the relevant variables) that it is not optimal for the lender to use these instruments fully to allocate credit. 3. The supply of funds must be such that at the Walrasian equilibrium (where demand equals supply, taking into account the use of non-price instruments), the expected returns to the lender are lower than for some other contract, at which there exists credit rationing.
The first condition, we would contend, is virtually always satisfied, but the second and third conditions may or may not be: we believe that credit markets are sometimes, but not always, characterized by credit rationing.4' When credit rationing is observed, it may be caused by other factors (such as legal restraints on the level of interest rates charged). But there are circumstances in which credit rationing occurs at interest rates below legally imposed ceilings.
Further, the comparative statics of these markets (with adverse selection and moral hazard, with or without credit rationing) look markedly different from those associated with standard markets, and it is these comparative static propositions which provide the bridge between the macroeconomic and macroeconomic analyses.
It should be stressed that the major differences between the comparative static properties of our model and other macroeconomic models continue to hold even if the economy is not in a rationing regime. These differences and the different effects of monetary policy in our model arise from the sorting and incentive effects of contracts, not from credit being rationed.
Standard representative agent models find it difficult to explain in a consistent manner the patterns of movements in productivity, real interest rates paid depositors and charged borrowers. The analysis here, as in much of other recent work on capital market imperfections, is predicated on the proposition that asymmetric information is particularly important in capital markets, that debt and equity contracts are different, and that understanding these differences is critical to understanding cyclical variability. Here, we have stressed the fact that interest rates charged need not, and will not in general, move in a way closely linked to movements in productivity. To put it somewhat loosely, the fraction of the total returns to an investment project which can be captured by lenders can vary over the business cycle, and indeed can vary depending on the source of the original shock to the economy.
The discrepancy between the return to the bank and total returns to investment projects has important welfare implications: it means not only that banks, in the process of sorting among potential borrowers, do not necessarily choose those loans with the highest total returns, but it also means that when credit is restricted, as through monetary policy, it is not necessarily the projects with the lowest return which are terminated.42 * Stanford University ** Boston University APPENDIX A Effects of cyclical changes in productivity on interest rates charged: partially separating equilibrium
Balanced producticity changes
In the case of balanced productivity changes (described in Section 2.1 .a), the contracts offered ({ F } 41 We can show that if the first two conditions are satisfied, then there always exists some credit supply functions for which credit rationing will occur. 42 Since v{G} is increased, the interest rate paid depositors is increased, and so is the aggregate quantity of loans. If this effect is not sufficient to eliminate rationing at contract G, both the proportion and absolute number of G loans would fall as banks making F loans are able to compete more aggressively for borrowers. Hence the average interest rate charged and average interest rate paid both increase with f. (move procyclically).
Unbalanced changes in success probabilities.
Under the assumptions given in Section 1.3.c, for a partially separating rationing equilibrium, the interest rates on both contracts (F} and (G} decrease when the success probabilities of risky projects have a greater percentage increase than the success probabilities of safe projects. We argued that these disproportionate changes are characteristic of booms. But the decrease in the interest rate at (G} may either exceed or be less than at (F}.
As we see from (10), depending on differences in non-collateralizable wealth between the rich and poor relative to their differences in collateralizable wealth and differences in their risk aversion, interest rates at the high collateral contract could fluctuate more or less over the business cycle than interest rates at the low collateral contract.
As before, the returns at (F } and (G} are altered, but by differing amounts. Hence, for the return at (F} to equal the return on (G}, the fraction of loans made at {G} will have to adjust, but it ambiguous whether it will increase or decrease. Accordingly, although there may be some presumption that the average rate of interest charged will decrease in a boom, it is possible that if the proportion of the rich getting loans is decreased enough, then the average rate of interest charged borrowers will actually increase.43
For sufficiently 'unbalanced' changes in productivity, interest rates paid depositors may fall, i.e. Our discussion in this section has been predicated on the changes in productivity being sufficiently small that there is no change in regime. Of course, with large productivity shocks, the economy may go from a situation where there is credit rationing, to one where there is not, or conversely. 43 It is possible that, as the economy enters a recession, the proportion of loans made at contract (F} increases. This is particularly striking, given that in slumps the (social) productivity of the risky technique is particularly low relative to that of safe techniques, and only loans at contract {F} are financing the risky technique. 
APPENDIX C Multiple contract equilibria
In the text, we restricted the analysis to the case where each bank offers a single contract. In this appendix, we extend the analysis to the case where each bank can offer multiple contracts. We show that the equilibria we derived in the text remain equilibria under this expansion of the admissible strategies. This change in the admissible strategies may result in their being additional equilibria. We do not pursue that possibility here.
In the case where banks can offer more than one contract, borrowers face a more difficult problem: assuming that the bank knows all the contracts for which a borrower has applied, the bank may make inferences based on those applications. The borrower then has to make an inference about what the bank will do if he applies for, say, two loans; this will, presumably, depend on what inferences the bank makes about the type of individual that applies for two loans. Since what will be critical in determining the nature of the equilibrium is beliefs about out of equilibrium moves, it is in this case that the variety of refinements of Nash equilibrium become important.
To see that the pooling equilibrium of Section 1.3a, with each bank offering a single contract, can easily be supported as a Nash equilibrium, consider a bank deviating from this equilibrium by offering several contracts.
Clearly in this case there are beliefs that would deter a bank from making that deviation. For instance, suppose all potential borrowers thought that the bank believed that borrowers that apply for any contract other than the lowest collateral one are rich. Because in the pooling equilibrium with rationing the return paid depositors is 1 + i = v.(F) > v(G), loans to rich borrowers generate losses; therefore, the belief that only rich borrowers apply for the higher collateral loans would lead borrowers to the further belief that if they applied for one of the high collateral contracts, the bank would not lend to them at any contract. Consequently, no borrowers would apply for the higher collateral contract, and offering more than one contract would be equivalent to offering only the lowest collateral contract. (Note that if a bank could commit itself to financing a fixed percentage of the applications for high-collateral-low-interest-rate loans, then the pooling equilibrium with rationing could always be broken. We do not consider it realistic to expect commitments of that sort to be enforceable.)
